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Division and Unification: Seen through the Eyes  
of Korean Migrants in Berlin 
Jin-Heon Jung & Eun-Jeung Lee ∗ 
Abstract: »Teilung und Vereinigung, aus Sicht von koreanischen Migranten in 
Berlin«. Based on qualitative fieldwork among first generation Korean immi-
grants in Berlin, this article sheds light on their lived experiences of German 
division and unification. Our research questions are threefold; first, how do 
these immigrants from the divided Korea perceive the division and unification 
of Germany? Second, did the fact that the division of Germany could be over-
come affect their views on the division and unification of the Korean Peninsu-
la? Third, are there any differences between Koreans in Germany and Koreans 
in Korea with respect to their views on unification? Our research suggests that 
different from South Korea, where the discourses in the media and the aca-
demia tend to assume sharply antagonistic attitudes, discourses among Koreans 
in Germany are generally much more supportive of unification. This is because 
they have a positive perception of German unification in everyday life and, fur-
thermore, have constructed for themselves a future-oriented identity as a peo-
ple of the Korean Peninsula that will eventually be unified. Korean immigrants 
in Germany are considerably more optimistic about the possibility of Korean 
unification than people in South Korea. 
Keywords: German Unification, Korean migrants, German Korean comparison, 
future. 
1.  Introduction 
The year 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s collapse. Kore-
ans walking along the remains of the Berlin Wall naturally think of the metal 
fence that stretches across the waist of the Korean Peninsula. Koreans still have 
to endure the pain of division and think of Germany as special because it has 
realized the dream of unification. As a result, Germany has a special place in 
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Korean people’s hearts and is the home for around 30,000 Korean immigrants.
1
 
The number of Korean immigrants pale in comparison to the number of Turk-
ish or Vietnamese immigrants in the country; however, they are considered a 
migrant group that has settled relatively successfully into German society (Kai-
ser 2013). What do Korean migrants think about “division and unification,” 
given that they came to West Germany when it was divided and then experi-
enced both German unification and 30 years of German integration? Has their 
experience of knowing that division can be overcome impacted how they view 
the division and unification of the Korean Peninsula? How do their perspec-
tives on unification differ from Koreans who live in South Korea? This study 
sought seeks to find answers to these questions through in-depth conducted 
with first-generation Korean immigrants living in Berlin, Germany. 
These questions are relevant due to the discourse about German reunifica-
tion in South Korea being characterized by the concept of “the other” as dis-
cussed in cultural theory. This discourse focuses on German unification, but 
ultimately the participants in this discourse are projecting their own concept of 
unification into the discussion. German reunification was a symbol of hope to 
Koreans that unification could be achieved. Up until the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, most South Koreans expected that North Korea would collapse as quick-
ly as East Germany did. The South Korean government and various institutes 
that conducted research on unification created a range of North Korean collapse 
scenarios and began to research responses to each of these scenarios as part of 
their efforts to comprehensively learn about Germany’s unification experience.  
It soon become very clear, however, that reunified Germany was paying as-
tronomically high costs because of the collapse of the East German economy 
and, consequently, fears that unification could be an economic burden became 
widespread in South Korea. South Korean experts competed with each other to 
announce the “unification costs” they had calculated that the South Korean 
government would have to pay based on the German government’s unification 
costs. The estimated economic burden that emerged from these specific figures 
led many South Koreans to ask whether the Korean Peninsula really needed to 
be unified. Ultimately, South Koreans transitioned from having vague fears 
toward unification to skepticism about unification altogether.  
Thirty years have passed since Germany has reunified and the South Korean 
discourse on Germany’s experience with unification continues to shift back and 
forth between hope and fear. German unification is still an important topic 
within discussions on unification in South Korea. Most South Korean politi-
cians, social scientists, and members of the media share their own opinions on 
                                                             
1
  There are almost no North Korean migrants living in Germany. There are only a few North 
Korean defectors who have been recognized as refugees along with a small number of 
North Korean foreign exchange students who came to East Germany in the 1960s and es-
caped to West Germany.  
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German unification. It is not an overstatement to say that the South Korean 
government still aims to learn all it can from Germany’s unification experi-
ence.
2
 
South Korea’s discourse on German unification, however, is very different 
from the unification discourse that occurred in Germany. Rai Kollmorgen and 
Thomas Koch discovered through a systematic analysis of the unification dis-
course in Germany that there were critical keywords used by different dis-
course participants. According to their research, the keywords that appeared in 
Germany’s social science sphere included the terms “late modernization” and 
“the two-sides of drastic change.” Meanwhile, the predominant keyword in 
Germany’s political sphere was “the construction of a modern and socialist 
state.” The discourse in Germany’s media, moreover, was dominated by four 
frameworks that defined East Germany and East Germans by “origin, charac-
teristics or differences, weakness, and burden.” On the other hand, the dis-
course on German unification in South Korea after the mid-1990s was defined 
by keywords such as “unification by absorption, unification costs, unification’s 
aftereffects, and internal integration” (Kollmorgen, Koch, and Dienel 2011). 
The focus of the South Korean discourse on German unification was clearly 
the reunification itself; however, what took on the central role in the formation 
of this discourse was Korea’s historical experiences, realities, political hopes 
and needs (E. Lee 2014). Of course, Germany’s experience did have a role in 
this discourse. Many South Korean politicians, scholars, and journalists visited 
Germany to learn about Germany’s unification experience, and many German 
experts were invited to South Korea to talk about German unification. The 
exchange of all this information likely had some impact on South Korea’s 
discourse on German unification. Nonetheless, the focus of this discourse in 
South Korea was less on Germany than on unification, and it has always been 
with the unification of the Korean Peninsula in mind. This discourse in South 
Korea, therefore, has directly reflected the range of South Korean perspectives 
toward the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As such, South Korea’s dis-
course on German unification has the characteristics of “the other” as discussed 
in Orientialism and Occidentialism.  
The perspectives toward unification held by South Korean migrants living in 
Germany are connected to the perspectives of “the other” inherent in South 
                                                             
2
  A great deal of research on German unification has taken place in South Korea. More than 
5,000 pieces of research focused on German unification have been presented from the 
1990s to the present and major dailies in the country report ceaselessly on Germany’s unifi-
cation and integration. The records of South Korea’s National Assembly have had 5,000 
mentions of German unification across a range of contexts since the 1990s. All of these dif-
ferent outlets of information have created South Korea’s own discourse on Germany unifi-
cation. See the contributions in the Forum of Historical Social Research 41 (2016) 3, availa-
ble at <https://www.gesis.org/en/hsr/full-text-archive/2016/413-established-outsider-
relations/>.  
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Korea’s discourse on German unification; however, this study operates under 
the assumption that migrants have an understanding of unification that is dif-
ferent from Koreans living in South Korea. This broad assumption has long 
provided the basis for research on the Korean diaspora. Existing research has 
found that migrants continue to maintain connections with their places of origin 
and emphasizes that migrants even have nostalgia for their home countries. As 
research on Koreans who reside in Japan shows, migrants create their own idea 
of the future for their home country using the perspectives and opinions they 
formed through their experiences abroad; moreover, this research has even 
confirmed that migrants tend to place their own identities in a home country 
that exists in the future.
3
 This study is founded on the assumptions reflected in 
existing research on the Korean diaspora. The interviews used in this study 
revealed that, regardless of where they stood on the political spectrum, Korean 
migrants in Germany naturally believed that the division of the Korean Penin-
sula must be overcome. The researchers also found that the migrants thought of 
themselves as citizens of a future, united Korean Peninsula. Before moving to 
explain the results of this study, the following section will describe this study’s 
processes, methodologies, and, lastly, the characteristics of the Korean diaspora 
in Germany, which form the social and cultural backgrounds of interviewees 
who participated in the study.  
2.  Research Subjects and Methodology  
The main interviewees of this study were first-generation South Koreans who 
live in Berlin. Most of the female interviewees were sent to West Berlin as 
nurses or nursing assistants in their early to mid-20s between 1966 and 1976 
and experienced the division of Berlin, the process of German unification, and 
Germany’s post-unification period. The majority of male interviewees were 
sent to West Germany as miners from 1963 and migrated to West Berlin for 
various reasons, including marriage and for work. The interviewees all experi-
enced Germany before and after unification and their ages ranged from the late 
60s to mid-70s at the time of the interviews. All the interviewees had lived in 
Germany for more than 40 years and had spent two-thirds of their lives residing 
in a foreign country, meaning that, culturally at least, they had a hybrid identi-
ty.
4
  
                                                             
3
  Sonia Ryang (2009) argues that the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan 
(Chongryon) National School students she studied place their own national identity not in 
North Korea but in a unified Korean Peninsula.  
4
  The concept of hybridity is evolved from the postcolonial theory of Homi Bhabha (1994) to 
the extent that it refers to the cultural hybridities of transnational migrant people in the 
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The hybrid identity of migrants refers to the mixture or changes in their 
knowledge, habits, values, religion, the food they enjoy, the languages they 
speak, emotional sentiments, and other cultural factors they picked up in their 
home countries with those of their host society and the process of acquiring 
multi-faceted perspectives, attitudes, and value systems. Hybridness includes 
those cases where existing habits and value systems fail to change and instead 
simply solidify even further. Their home societies may have changed rapidly 
due to the passage of time, but migrant communities are frequently more con-
servative in their thinking and habits compared to the societies they left. As 
such, there is diversity between generations, genders, and individuals within 
any migrant community. In other words, migrant communities are hybrid, 
diverse, and dynamic groups.  
First-generation Korean migrants in Berlin experienced Western European 
liberalism, democracy, and multiculturalism. However, most of the migrants 
had similar or enhanced levels of anti-communist sentiment typical of South 
Koreans in the 1960s in 1970s. Other migrants had transformed their views to 
correspond with post-ideological, pan-national, or even pro-North Korean 
perspectives. In the midst of this deeply divided ideological spectrum, there 
were many migrants who wanted to become politically detached from the situa-
tion on the Korean Peninsula and avoid being placed on the political spectrum.
5
  
This article attempts a life-history approach through participant observation 
and in-depth interviews that conform with on-site anthropological research 
methodologies. The researchers created a rapport with the migrants while par-
ticipating in their community activities in Berlin over a long period of time and 
made efforts to learn their own points of view. The interviews were conducted 
on the basis of this rapport with the migrants. Apart from formal interviews, the 
researchers attempted to gather a comprehensive understanding of the inter-
viewees’ unique lives and culture. In-depth interviews were conducted with 
only those migrants who agreed to participate. The mid- to long-term process 
of participant observation began in 2016 and is still ongoing. The interview 
data analyzed for this study were collected from approximately 60 interviews 
conducted from February to August 2016.  
                                                                                                                                
multiculturalism studies. See also Vertovec (1997) and Safran (1991) for further discussion 
about the concept of diasporas.  
5
  This may prove that the geopolitical Cold War system of the Korean Peninsula strongly 
impacts migrant communities, but it is also impossible to ignore the history of state vio-
lence perpetrated by South Korea in Germany. The Dongbaekrim Incident (1967-1969) along 
with European spy ring cases and South Korean agents who, directly and indirectly, incited 
South Korean migrant communities to move to the political right, among other historical 
and social factors, have likely led to this kind of political aversion among Korean migrants.  
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3.  South Korean Diaspora in Germany6 
Germany and South Korea began official diplomatic ties after signing a coop-
eration agreement in 1883. After the end of World War II in 1945 and German 
division, East Germany formed a special relationship with North Korea right 
after its establishment by, among other things, accepting North Korean war 
orphans in the 1950s. Meanwhile, West Germany formed a close relationship 
with South Korea’s government while concluding an agreement to accept 
South Korean nurses and miners in 1963. From 1966 to 1976, 10,226 nurses 
and 7,932 miners were sent to Germany. They formed the first overseas Korean 
community along with small groups of South Korean students who had studied 
in West Germany since the 1950s.  
Some of these first-generation migrants no longer live in Germany. While 
there are no accurate statistics available, interviews with migrants suggest that 
around one-third of the original migrants stayed in Germany while another one-
third returned to South Korea after the end of their contracts. The rest migrated 
again to the United States, Canada, and other parts of North America. The all-
encompassing characteristics of these first-generation migrants are that they 
grew up during the Korean War, experienced poverty, and received intense 
levels of anti-communist education that taught them to hate communist North 
Korea. The West Germany they came to was similar to South Korea. Unlike 
the confrontation that existed between North and South Korea, however, a 
limited degree of travel was allowed between West and East Germany at the 
time. South Koreans who lived in West Berlin were able to visit East Berlin. 
Some of them even visited the North Korean embassy in East Berlin and met 
with North Korean diplomats. This was, of course, a violation of South Korea’s 
anti-communist laws.
7
 In 1967, South Korea’s military dictatorship, led by Park 
Chung Hee, abducted South Koreans living in West Germany in order to bring 
them back to Seoul and put them on trial. Some were sentenced to death.
8
 
                                                             
6
  The concept of diaspora used to refer to the Jewish communities dispersed across regions in 
the past. But as the transnational migrations increased, it became more inclusive to denote 
the ethnic groups of the people who settle down in new host societies. See Clifford (1994) 
for more discussions.  
7
  You Jae Lee (2018) re-examines the East Berlin Incident and points out that the South 
Korean militant regime failed to consider a different sense of spatiotemporality of the Cold 
War that the South Korean migrants in Germany came to experience in the context of the 
transnational migration. It is fair to say that the state power dominated the foreign mone-
tary funding from Germany and controlled the grassroots transnationalism as an excuse 
derived from the national division. In other words, the East Berlin Incident reveals an anach-
ronistic ignorance of the state power.  
8
  The Dongbaekrim (East Berlin) Incident emerged through an announcement by South 
Korea’s Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) on July 8, 1967, that 194 South Koreans, 
including Lee Eung-ro, a painter who lived in Paris, and the Berlin-based writer Yoon Yi-
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Within these circumstances, the South Korean community in West Germany 
either actively participated in the democracy movement against the dictatorship 
and supported the movement,
9
 or threw their support behind the Park govern-
ment’s developmental authoritarianism. Even following South Korea’s transi-
tion to democracy in 1987, these two groups are still at odds with each other.
10
 
4.  The Unification Experience and Views toward Unifi-
cation among First-Generation South Koreans in Berlin  
4.1  The Collapse of Borders: The Collapse of the Berlin Wall and 
German Unification through the Eyes of Korean Migrants 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall occurred “suddenly” and was totally unex-
pected by both Germans and migrants who lived in the country. On the night of 
November 9, 1989, East Berliners who had crossed over the Berlin Wall were 
welcomed by West Berliners. The harsh levels of control over the wall had 
disappeared and the areas around the wall became similar to that of a festival. 
The collapse of the wall had become a gateway to a new post-Cold War era. 
Koreans residing in Berlin expressed their memories of the time in sentimental 
language and used words like “thrilling” and “joyful”; yet, their feelings were 
                                                                                                                                
sang, along with professors who had studied abroad in Europe and South Korean students 
who were studying abroad, were part of a North Korean spy ring in East Berlin. Members of 
West Germany’s cultural and media spheres, along with local citizens and students, led the 
international movement to release the accused. The West German government’s strong pro-
tests led the accused, who had received execution, life-in-prison, or 10-year prison sentenc-
es, to have their sentences commuted in 1969-1970.  
9
  In the 1970s, the Committee for Constructing Democratic Society was founded by educated 
migrants, such as study abroad students and scholars, who contributed to the progressives, 
or we can say, the democratization movements, in South Korea. See Yi (2016) for detailed 
information.  
10
 Recently, North Korean defectors have applied for refugee status in Germany. In the early 
2000s, with the enactment of the US North Korean Human Rights Act, England, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and other European countries began to accept North Ko-
rean refugees for humanitarian reasons. However, the North Korean defectors who headed 
en masse to Europe at this time were either those who had already received citizenship in 
South Korea or were Chinese-Koreans. Following these revelations, European countries have 
drastically reduced the number of North Korean refugees they accept; however, there are 
North Korean defectors living in a refugee facility in Stuttgart. These defectors either lived 
in South Korea before moving to Germany for their children’s education or, more rarely, 
came straight to Germany from China. In Berlin, there are North Korean refugees who left 
South Korea to study abroad. However, there are many fewer North Korean refugees in 
Germany than the 500 or so North Korean defectors who live in England’s New Malden. 
North Korean defectors did not experience the division and unification of Germany, so this 
study did not include their perspectives. 
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complicated because they were “not sure how to react” to these “surprising” 
circumstances. 
On November 10, the day after the collapse of the wall, a few members of 
the “Korean Women's Association in Germany,” which was made up of nurses 
and had long been engaged in politically progressive activities, “got up the 
courage” to visit the site of the fallen Berlin Wall. At the site, they hung up a 
poster that said, “Korea is One.”11 They may have been one of the first “flash 
mobs” to link the collapse of the Berlin Wall with their own hopes for the end 
of Korean division.  
The collapse of the Berlin Wall was an important historical moment where 
migrants from a divided country experienced a post-division era in their life. 
This is proven by the fact that, even though almost 30 years have passed, our 
interviewees vividly remember the night of November 9, 1989. “K,” who 
worked as a nurse in West Berlin in 1972, explained her emotions that night.  
Ah, yes, I still remember that day. I always turned on the television when I 
came home. I worked with sick people, so I turned on the TV to think about 
something else. It was Thursday. The TV said that unification had arrived […] 
that the wall had fallen. People from East Germany just started coming over 
[into West Germany]. West Germans took the withered flowers they had in 
their homes and stood there, and even hugged people who weren’t their rela-
tives. I was really taken by that scene. Them giving flowers […] I don’t re-
member how much I cried in tears while watching that. I wondered how great 
it’d be if Korea could unify like that. I went out to the city the next day and it 
was just full of people. There were a lot of people from East Germany and, 
from what I heard, there were no incidents at all. It was just peaceful unifica-
tion. How great it’d be if Korea could experience that kind of unification, too. 
When I began thinking like that, I just started crying […] I just sat down and 
cried. 
For Koreans living in Berlin, the end of the German division was closely relat-
ed to the persisting division of the Korean Peninsula. It was part of their own 
narrative and they shared in the emotions felt by regular Germans. They did not 
turn the realities of Korea’s division into someone else’s problem, either. While 
Germans celebrated the collapse of the Berlin Wall, “K” put the situation in the 
context of Korea’s own situation and hoped for the same change to occur on 
the Korean Peninsula.  
The narrative of post-division that “K” shared was not just the physical fall 
of the wall; rather, it had a double-layered meaning. While adapting to a differ-
ent culture after migrating abroad, Koreans residing in Berlin experienced 
layered border-crossing. While experiencing the realities of German society, 
they had experienced conflict with, the elimination of, and/or the restructuring 
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 See Jaedokhankukyŏsŏngmoim (Korean Women’s Association in Germany) (2014) for the 
history of the social activism that the Korean women had led and organized in Germany. 
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of the anti-communist ideology, or “Red Complex,” they had learned in South 
Korea.  
4.2  The Structure of Feelings and Trans-Border Narratives 
The German unification that Korean migrants in Berlin experienced, the com-
parisons they made with the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and their hopes 
for unification can be understood through the concept of Raymond Williams’ 
“structures of feeling” (1973). Feelings in this context are slightly different 
than that of the intellectual exercise of “thinking”; however, they are mutually 
reinforcing spheres and are not in a confrontational relationship. Antonio 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is useful for understanding the ideology and 
discourse formed by dominant classes, while Williams’ concept focuses on the 
sphere of feelings, where diverse change occurs from the bottom-up or from 
non-dominant classes. Williams proposes that the spheres of feeling can be 
divided into the dominant, residual, and the emergent. This structure of layered 
emotions originates from people’s experiences. While an ideological system 
may be perceived homogeneously in a logical structure, the structure of feeling 
adds texture to that system. It becomes the engine for inducing internal change 
and becomes the concept to understand that change.  
The first-generation Koreans that migrated to Germany in the 1960s and 
1970s experienced the Korean War while they were young children and re-
ceived anti-communist education before migrating to the center of the Cold 
War in Europe, Germany. Most Korean migrants arrived in Germany with 
ideologies and feelings dominated by the anti-communist ideology and by anti-
North Korean sentiment. “P,” a nurse from Daegu who arrived in West Berlin 
in 1966 told the researchers that “we received education meant to refine us 
before we left for Germany. The course didn’t teach us about German culture 
or society. It was just focused on anti-communist education.”  
Anti-communist education in South Korea at the time was not aimed at im-
parting knowledge about Germany. Rather, it was aimed at ensuring Korean 
migrants were knowledgeable about what was prohibited and was meant to 
scare them with the punishment and harm they could face if they broke the 
rules. Their responses were thus based on emotions, not rationality. “C,” who 
arrived in West Berlin in 1966, had a similar experience.  
Everyone was praying to themselves that I wouldn’t be sent to Berlin. When it 
turned out I was going, everyone, even my family, was really concerned. They 
told me not to go into the Berlin subway station Friedrichstrasse. I was really 
scared each time I passed that station. 
 “P” and “C” were from the Korean War generation, but had not witnessed the 
horrors of the war themselves.  
When I was young, I was told to hide under the floors, so I did what everyone 
older than me was doing. No People’s Army [North Korean army] soldiers 
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came to my neighborhood so I really didn’t know what the war was like. I was 
scared of the ‘commies’ and that fear stayed with me for a long time. 
“P” and other interviewees found that their anti-communist sentiments stayed 
with them for a long time even after moving to Germany. The responses of 
Korean migrants toward the fall of the Berlin Wall were, compared to regular 
Germans, quite complicated. During informal talks with the Korean migrants, it 
was found that quite a few of them had immediately felt fear accompanied by 
surprise when they heard that the Berlin Wall had fallen.  
“I was scared at first. For a long time, I didn’t go into the neighborhood 
where the wall had been.” This was one expression used casually by many 
Korean migrants during conversations with this study’s researchers. Whether 
the migrants had participated in politically progressive activities or not, they all 
elicited similar responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall. One of them, “L,” came 
to West Berlin in 1973 and has two children with her German husband, who is 
a doctor. She did not participate much in the local Korean community’s activi-
ties and did not engage in politically progressive activities; however, her hus-
band’s brothers and relatives were in East Germany, so she witnessed familial 
exchanges across the two Germanies. When the Berlin Wall collapsed, howev-
er, she was full of fear that a whole wave of East Germans would flow into 
West Berlin and cause chaos. In short, “L”’s residual anti-communist sentiment 
emerged as a defense mechanism to the rapid changes in her social environ-
ment. The fear that accompanied her initial surprise at the fall of the Berlin 
Wall withered as she accepted the broader sentiments of West Germans, who 
had pursued change in the division system through contact with East Germans.  
Koreans in Berlin adapted relatively quickly and participated in the post-
division atmosphere, which was similar to that of a festival. This was because 
they had experienced Germany’s division. This suggests that they had to com-
plete their own “experiential review” of the division situation first before ap-
plying the experience of Germany’s unification to the context of the Korean 
Peninsula or gain an understanding of it. There was an “iron curtain” that sepa-
rated West and East Germany, but Germany had allowed considerable levels of 
exchanges, direct and indirect, that stood in contrast to the uncrossable armi-
stice line that separated the two Koreas. Visits between families, exchanges of 
letters, listening to each other’s broadcasts, and other low-level moves toward 
“unification” that the two Koreas have pursued were, in actuality, the reality of 
the “division” that existed between East and West Germany. Many Korean 
migrants experienced something that was impossible on the Korean Peninsula: 
crossing borders for personal reasons. For example, “P” experienced familial 
exchanges as her family from West Berlin visited those in East Berlin and vice 
versa, while “H” frequently went to East Berlin to participate in picnics put on 
by her local Korean church. Finally, “K” visited East Berlin with her German 
husband as tourists.  
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I went to East Berlin two or three times in 1975, 1976 and 1977 […] for pic-
nics. I would receive my visa in the morning – an “ein Tag,” or single-day vi-
sa. I would arrive in East Berlin in the morning and have to return in the eve-
nings. I had to change the money I’d use for the day before I left. It was like 
20 marks or something those days. After changing my money, I would have to 
bring it with me [to East Berlin].  
“K” crossed a border that she had learned initially never to cross or communi-
cate over and her experience of going to a “picnic” in East Berlin likely created 
emotions that were borderless in nature. Migrants felt feelings of unfamiliarity 
and exhilaration because they felt they were breaking some kind of rule and 
these emotions were clearly seen on their faces as they spoke with the re-
searchers. The migrants remembered their experience because of the new sets 
of emotions they had felt. These new emotions acted as a mechanism that al-
lowed them to compare their current circumstances with those of their home 
country or, in other words, allowed them to reflect on the division of the Kore-
an Peninsula.  
I travelled to [East Berlin] in that way […] I wondered when I could take a 
similar holiday on the Korean Peninsula and visit both sides. When can I go 
there [North Korea] and each cake? Or drink coffee […] I was so envious [of 
reunified Germany]. 
Germany and the Korean Peninsula were similar in some respects: both were 
divided countries and served as the front lines for the Cold War in their respec-
tive areas of Europe and Asia. The specific nature of their divisions was, how-
ever, different. The two countries were divided in different ways and only one 
had endured a horrible civil war. The levels of confrontation that had become 
embedded through experience and by institutions across the two sides also 
differed. Most research on German unification points out that comparing Ger-
many and the Korean Peninsula is inappropriate because of their different 
historical backgrounds – in short, Korea’s experience during the Korean War. 
However, Koreans who were born during the Korean War period and received 
anti-communist education before moving to Berlin experienced opportunities to 
reflect on the fact that remnants of their “learned” anti-communism and its 
harmful effects were roadblocks to their initial adaptation to life in West Ber-
lin. In other words, their first careful visits to East Berlin or their repeated 
experience of crossing the land border into East Germany slowly, or even dras-
tically, lowered the levels of anti-communist sentiment that they had. They also 
formed hope that the two Koreas would improve their relationship based on the 
German experience of tearing down borders. Borrowing Williams’ concept of 
the “structures of feeling,” Korean migrants formed a trans-border structure of 
feeling by experiencing life abroad.  
The prefix “trans” here does not refer to the words “overcoming,” “surpas-
sing,” or “after.” Rather, it should be understood as a transitional experience. 
This is similar to the “trans” used in the process of change as interpreted in 
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post-socialism research. In other words, the trans-border sentiments formed by 
Korean migrants who lived in Berlin during the division of Germany could be 
said to have included the remnants of anti-communist ideology, the history of 
the Dongbaekrim Incident, and other European spy rings that involved their 
home country’s military dictatorship, their fears about the National Security 
Law (NSL), or that they would be targets of surveillance. As such, their imme-
diate responses and interpretations to the fall of the Berlin Wall were simulta-
neously similar to regular Germans yet different, which meant that the meaning 
of German unification to them was at once both more complicated and full of 
richness. They also had unique experiences while meeting with former East 
Germans after unification.  
4.3  The Integration Process after Unification: Multi-Cultural 
Sentiments  
The two Germanies reunited just one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989. During the period of division, West Berlin, which was like an island in 
East Germany, witnessed an influx of people and capital. Even the hospitals 
where Korean nurses worked saw the arrival of East German nurses. The hos-
pital was a cultural contact zone where the people from East and West Germa-
ny, and East Germans and Korean nurses, collided and negotiated their mutual 
authority and values in daily life. Korean nurses many times had relatively high 
status and authority in West Berlin hospitals.  
Korean nurses generally thought that East German nurses had such little ex-
perience dealing with other kinds of people that they were unfriendly and 
looked down on Korean nurses. The former Korean nurses remember that East 
German nurses thought that the Korean nurses were seated lower on the hierar-
chy and gave them odd jobs to do and were high-handed in how they spoke to 
them. East German nurses did not understand why West German nurses re-
ceived orders from Korean head nurses. East German nurses would frequently 
try to cause issues between German nurses and doctors and Korean nurses by 
talking behind their backs. Experienced Korean nurses were confused at the 
East German nurses’ discriminatory way of speaking and the workplace con-
flict that they were suddenly faced with. As “L” states: 
I spoke slowly and they [East German nurses] understood. It was the first time 
for them to work with people like us. […] It was probably because they had 
developed socialist habits. Talking with them, though, showed that they had 
an innocent side. They just didn’t know better. 
“L” had trouble with some of her East German colleagues, but she understood 
the difficulties were due to cultural differences, not personal ones, the hierar-
chy they had learned in East Germany, and their general lack of sentimentality. 
As a result, she emphasized a “pure” temperament in her personal relation-
ships. This showed the East German nurses that she cared about them. The 
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period of chaos in the early days of unification – including the currency reform, 
rise in taxes, fall in welfare, increase in population, and fast-paced urban de-
velopment – put East Germans at a socio-economic level lower than most West 
Germans. “L” thus tried to understand the difficulties experienced by East 
German nurses, who likely found it difficult to accept that Korean nurses were 
considered to be at a higher status than themselves.  
While Korean nurses were familiar with West German workplace culture 
and daily life, East German nurses found everything unfamiliar. “S” said in the 
interview that East German nurses who had moved to West Berlin then moved 
back to their original neighborhoods and had to face long commutes. When “S” 
asked the East German nurses why they did this, she was told that their original 
neighborhoods felt more like a community and were just better to live in. 
West German social life divided working and private spaces and their ac-
companying relationships. Former East Germans, however, tried to maintain 
their socialist communal culture in response to the liberal culture of West Ger-
many. One interviewee said that in East Germany there was, to borrow a Kore-
an expression, more “jong” (affection) and that East Germans were “purer” 
than those who had become used to competition in the capitalist world.  
Korean migrants’ direct experience of unification has major implications for 
the Korean Peninsula. Their experiences provide a criterion for comparing 
small-scale social phenomena that will emerge in the integration of South Ko-
rean society – which, as a neo-liberal system, has rapidly transformed into a 
multi-cultural, multi-race society – with North Korean society, which has em-
phasized the “purity” of the Korean race. In short, North and South Korean 
people’s pursuit of the “integration of their hearts” is not something that just 
occurs within one people, i.e., the Korean people. Koreans who live in Germa-
ny are showing that a country’s multi-cultural and multi-racial circumstances 
can become a factor in national integration. This should not be overlooked in 
the context of South Korean society, which has witnessed a great deal of trans-
national movement. The sphere of the “heart” does not just include emotions 
and feelings but also encompasses the intellectual activities of perceptions and 
understanding. Because the concept of the “nation” is not just biological but 
also historical and cultural in nature, there are limitations to meetings that 
simply occur between North and South Koreans. Korean migrants’ experience 
of unification in Berlin and their interpretations show the need for discussion 
on inter-Korean integration that considers the daily exchanges and communica-
tion with migrants who are a part of Korean culture.  
4.4  Hopes for the Unification of the Divided Motherland in a 
Unified Germany 
The fall of the Berlin Wall was a historical event that created hope among 
Korean migrants for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. After the 
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June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in 2000 between Kim Dae Jung and 
Kim Jong Il, politically progressive activists tried to actively contribute to 
inter-Korean unification. From 2008 to 2017, when the logic of the Cold War 
resurfaced during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments, these 
activists were refused entry into South Korea, among other acts of suppression 
by these South Korean administrations. The activists nevertheless continued 
their efforts for peaceful unification through a variety of ways. They have 
formed a kind of “social remittance” through their solidarity activities abroad 
and participation in South Korea’s unification movement.  
Social remittances are different from financial remittances and refer to the 
intangible assets that migrants contribute to their home countries, such as new 
knowledge, values, lifestyles, and skills.12 Since they are intangible, it is diffi-
cult to measure how much is being contributed from a quantitative perspective. 
However, there is a need to examine the characteristics of these social remit-
tances through transformations in the perspectives of Korean migrants, the 
types of perspectives they hold, and their understanding of German unification. 
This study’s participant observation allowed the researchers to summarize 
specifics about this social remittance phenomenon.  
First, activists argue there is a need to resolve confrontation between the two 
Koreas through inter-Korean communication similar in nature to the sustained 
exchanges that occurred between East and West Germany during the German 
division. As explained before, Korean migrants in Berlin experienced entering 
East Germany without restrictions. There are feelings of confrontation between 
the two Koreas because of the Korean War, but activists argue that fears of 
North Korea are due to direct and indirect pressure on the migrant community 
by South Korea’s NSL. Using the case of German division, they argue for 
divided family reunions, freedom of exchanges, and more exchanges through 
private organizations as possible ways to resolve the fictitious confrontational 
sentiments that exist between the two Koreas.  
Second, activists emphasize that perspectives need to change to become 
more proactive and subjective toward Korea’s relationship with world powers 
like the US. “M,” who is a former miner, now in his 70s, and is working in the 
European office of the “Joint Committee to Put the June 15 Agreement into 
Practice,” says that “there is a need for the South Korean government to active-
ly reduce the tensions on the Korean Peninsula that are controlled by the US.” 
His understanding of international relations leads him to believe that “Germany 
was also under a lot of US influence and still cares about what America’s 
thinks, but [nonetheless] was not as severely dependent on the US as Korea is.” 
They also criticize America’s sanctions against North Korea, feel sadness about 
                                                             
12
 For more on the concept of social remittances, please see Levitt (1998, 2001) and Levitt and 
Lamba-Nieves (2011). 
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the Arduous March that North Korea suffered, and recognize that negotiations 
rather than opposition to nuclear weapons is the way to improve the US-North 
Korean relationship. These opinions are based on the understanding that the 
Kim Dae Jung government’s Sunshine Policy, and its support for independent 
and tolerant policies toward North Korea, is similar to Willy Brandt’s East 
Policy. 
Third, the implications of West Germany’s East Policy are not that Korean 
migrants in Germany look at unification as the end result, but rather as a pro-
cess of shifting the paradigm. As described above, the interviewees explained 
that German unification “was a surprise.” In other words, German unification 
was sudden. Migrants understand that unification is not the end result of efforts 
to reunify, but rather that the collapse of the socialist bloc and the Berlin Wall 
came about through policies that continued regardless of changes in govern-
ment and were aimed at achieving exchanges between West and East Germany. 
On the other hand, they point out that South Korean society has long placed a 
priority on results in its socio-economic development, so it misses the im-
portance of this process. Patience is required to conduct discussions that can 
lead to agreements. South Korean society has experienced compressed moder-
nity, so it will not be easy to shift the paradigm through a long process. None-
theless, activists and migrants have made attempts to share this important “val-
ue” with South Korean society.  
The above discussion ultimately emphasizes that the experience of Korean 
migrants toward German division and unification is not something in the past 
but is linked meaningfully to the present and future. These temporal sentiments 
also prove that the “homeland” or “hometown” imagined abroad continues to 
exist through the past and into the future.  
5.  Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to reexamine and analyze the way first-
generation Korean migrants in Germany experienced Germany’s division and 
reunification. They left a divided Korea and came to a divided Germany and 
experienced “another Cold War” in both Asia and Europe. They were then 
witnesses to the country’s rapid post-division process. However, Korea’s divi-
sion is still ongoing. The experience and interpretations of these migrants to-
ward German unification cannot be separated from the current situation of the 
divided Korean Peninsula. Interestingly, however, the dominant keywords in 
the discourse on German unification in South Korea are not important in their 
own narratives about German unification. They place their own identities into a 
future, united Korea. Temporal borders have served to damage its significance.  
The changing political situation in Germany and Korea along with Korean 
migrants’ concept of borders, which must be considered, have become the 
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“field” of solidarity and transitional narratives. The trans-border feelings they 
possess ensures that their life histories will not just remain tragic narratives 
from the past. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, they began dreaming of inter-
Korean unification and are now conducting ceremonies in Berlin’s streets fo-
cused on Korea’s unified future. These ceremonies can demolish the armistice 
line on the Korean Peninsula just like similar ceremonies did to the Berlin 
Wall, and they hope Korea’s armistice line soon becomes so fluid that it can be 
crossed. Through these ceremonies, the word in German for “border,” Grenze, 
and Grenzgänger, or “those on the border,” have the meanings of “crossing,” 
“surpassing,” or “compatibility,” as well as temporal and spatial meanings. 
Korean migrants are hoping that a unified Berlin, where physical barriers have 
been demolished, can become a space that connects Seoul and Pyongyang.  
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